Optimal Timing for an IPO with Market Sentiment' by José Diogo Oliveira de Castro Ferreira
Optimal Timing for an IPO
with Market Sentiment
Author:
Jose´ Diogo Oliveira de Castro Ferreira
Master in Finance Dissertation
Supervisor:
Prof. Paulo Jorge Marques de Oliveira Ribeiro Pereira
September 2014
Biographical Note
Jose´ Diogo Oliveira Castro Ferreira was born in Coimbra in 1987. Raised in
Sa˜o Joa˜o da Madeira, moved to Porto in 2005 to start his Bachelor Degree in
Economics, which was finished in 2009 at Faculdade de Economia da Univer-
sidade do Porto. After some professional experiences that ranged between
auditing, consulting and sales promoter, decided to return to his school to
pursue his dream and study Financial Markets more closely. The reading
of some books, such as Technical Analysis of Stock Trends from Edwards,
Magee and Bassetti (2007) or Futuros e Outros Derivados from Domingos
Ferreira (2010), inspired him to give this step forward in order to define a
clear path for his career. Since July of 2014 he is working in Lisbon at BNP
Paribas Securities Services, dealing with the settlement of trades.
i
Acknowledgments
First of all, I would like to thank Professor Paulo Pereira for his excelent
work, dedication and motivation during this last year. It was an honour for
me to work with you and to spend some hours in front of a board thinking
how would managers react, what they would do and what are the payoffs for
each situation. The way that this work evolved was a challenge for both of
us and, fortunately, you were there to help guiding me during this path.
Secondly, I would like to thank my parents. They helped me in the last
few years and for me is an honour to show them this work. It wasn’t always
a simple path, but patience paid off.
I have to acknowledge the help of all of my friends, specially Alexandra
Almeida who supported and listened to me when this Dissertation was in a
less solid ground.
Finally, to Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto, an honourable
school, filled with history and knowledge. The staff from library deserves a
special word for being always so kind and gentile. For my Professors during
both degrees, I have to say that you helped and inspired me establishing a
path in my life. There is only one more name I will quote because of the
important role he had during this Master. To Professor Oliveira Marques,
who transmitted us his huge knowledge in a relaxed, but always demanding
way. I will always remember his quote in my first Master class, in Theoretical
Foundations of Finance: ”If any of you ends the semester without doubts,
I’ve failed in my mission”. It was an honour to meet you Professor.
ii
Contents
Biographical Note i
Acknowledgments ii
Abstract vii
Suma´rio viii
1 Introduction 1
2 Literature Review 4
3 The Market Sentiment and the Optimal Timing for an IPO 12
3.1 Benchmark Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 Solution of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4 Comparative Statics and Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4.1 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4.2 Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.5 Studying the Market Sentiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.6 Conclusion of the chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4 IPOs, Market Sentiment and Investment Opportunity 22
4.1 The Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3 Solution of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
iii
4.4 Numerical Example and Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.5 Studying the market sentiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.6 Conclusion of the chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5 Conclusion 40
5.1 Contribution to Financial Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.2 Further Work and Limitations of our Model . . . . . . . . . . 41
Bibliography 43
iv
List of Figures
1.1 Variation in the number monthly of IPOs since January 2005 . 2
4.1 Representation of equation (4.5) from Adkins and Paxson (2011).
Source: Adkins and Paxson (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2 Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3 Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different θV1 ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1 . . . . . . . . 32
4.4 Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different θV2 ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1 . . . . . . . . 33
4.5 Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different ρ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1 . . . . . . . . 33
4.6 Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different σV1 ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1 . . . . . . . . 34
4.7 Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different σV2 ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1 . . . . . . . . 35
4.8 Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different φ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1 . . . . . . . . 36
4.9 Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different θV2 ’s 38
v
List of Tables
3.1 Data for the application of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1 Data for the application of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2 Results from variations in V1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3 Results from variations in θV1 . The remaining inputs are ac-
cording to Table 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4 Results from variations in ρ. The remaining inputs are ac-
cording to Table 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.5 Results from variations in σV1 . The remaining inputs are ac-
cording to Table 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.6 Results from variations in σV2 . The remaining inputs are ac-
cording to Table 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.7 Results from variations in φ. The remaining inputs are ac-
cording to Table 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
vi
Abstract
Performing an IPO can be one of the most enthusiastic moments in the life of
a company. However, during the last decades a lot of criticism has arisen due
to some irrationality that is associated with this sector of Financial Markets.
In this work we propose two models that are based on the work of Bustamante
(2012). The first is a simpler version of reality in which the owner tries to
sell part of his company. In this case it is assumed that the company is well-
established and without any growth opportunity. The second one includes
the idea of an IPO to expand the companies activities and, therefore, its
cash flows. As a result, we conclude that the market sentiment plays a
very interesting role in the definition of the moment of the IPO. This role is
diminished when we are considering the second case.
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Suma´rio
Realizar uma OPV pode ser um dos momentos mais entuasmantes na vida de
uma empresa. No entanto, nas u´ltimas de´cadas teˆm existido muitas cr´ıticas
relacionadas com a irracionalidade associada a este setor dos Mercados Finan-
ceiros. Neste trabalho propomos dois modelos que teˆm por base o trabalho
de Bustamante (2012). O primeiro e´ uma versa˜o simplista da realidade em
que o dono da empresa tenta vender parte da mesma, estando esta bem esta-
belecida e na˜o tendo oportunidades de crescimento. O segundo modelo inclui
a ideia de a OPV ser feita para expandir as atividades da empresa e, assim,
os seus cash flows. Como resultado, conclu´ımos que o sentimento do mercado
tem um papel bastante interessante na definic¸a˜o do momento da OPV. Este
papel e´ diminu´ıdo quando consideramos o segundo caso.
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
When in 1602 the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) or, as is more
commonly known, the Dutch East India Company, performed its Initial Pub-
lic Offering (IPO), this was a historical moment. A new kind of corporate
strategy was created in order to gather money to the company to finance
its activities. This company was considered by the Global Financial Data
website 1 as one of the biggest companies in history.
It took precisely 180 years to take place the first IPO in American soil. The
pioneer company was Bank of North America and was a private business that
aimed to control the governmental accounts in a period of Civil War.2
Being these the precursors of the history of IPO activity, these type of cor-
porate strategy became more and more usual. The markets have witnessed
several periods where companies have resorted to this strategy in order to
allow for the exit of initial shareholders, to fund further investments or, sim-
ply, to take advantage of the market.
Below there is a graphic that highlights this evolution since January 2005.
This graphic was built according to the data available in the IPO Center
1See: https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/gfdblog/?p=1518
2For more information visit: http://blogs.wellsfargo.com/guidedbyhistory/2010/04/bank-
of-north-america/
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Figure 1.1: Variation in the number monthly of IPOs since January 2005
from the Renaissance Capital3.
From figure 1.1 we can see that the IPO market is extremely volatile and
has faced some periods of almost no activity (in October of 2008 there were
no IPOs in the US market). This raises some questions. First, what drives
the owners to turn their firms publicly listed? Second, why is this activity
so volatile? Third, what are the value drivers for this decision?
In this work we intend to provide a Real Options Model which helps to
time the IPO decision of the owners of the companies that are considering
this process. Regarding the first question raised above, it is not our objec-
tive to answer to it. However, a brief presentation of the main reasons for
IPOs can be found in the next chapter. The other two question are one of
the main interests of this work. We have built two models to time the IPOs.
The first model considers the IPO process for companies that have no growth
opportunities and intend to take advantage of market overvaluations. In the
second model we consider the existence of growth opportunities. However,
unlike other authors, we consider that this opportunity is to invest in a new
segment rather than to expand the current line of business.
This work is organized as follows: first, we present some relevant literature;
3See: http://www.renaissancecapital.com/ipohome/press/ipofilings.aspx
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after that we develop the two models. Finally we conclude, summarizing the
main findings of each model and providing some paths for future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Performing an Initial Public Offering (IPO) is a huge decision in the life of a
company, having great impact on the day-to-day of the business. Its prepara-
tion consumes time of the management team and of the Board, requires the
presentation of the company to investors, auditing processes, filing of regu-
latory documents, besides other costly activities. Besides this, the company
must choose the optimal moment to initiate the process, gathering infor-
mation from the market in order to ensure a successful offering. The main
motivations referred in the literature for the company are the creation of liq-
uidity for its stocks, being possible for initial shareholders to exit, the raise
of funds for future investment, the creation of another way of payment for
mergers and acquisitions (through the exchange of stocks of the company)
and the enhancement of the image of the company.
Several authors have studied the reasons to perform an IPO, using differ-
ent methods. Brau and Fawcett (2006) surveyed CFOs of companies that
have performed an IPO, CFOs of companies that withdrew the process and
others of companies that have never tried it. Ro¨ell (1996) compiled the con-
clusions of several articles, identifying the main motivations for IPOs. Using
another method, Rydqvist and Ho¨gholm (1995), Pagano et al. (1998) and
Albornoz and Pope (2004) complement this kind of analysis with economet-
ric studies.
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One of the reasons usually addressed in literature is the opportunity to exit
that initial shareholders obtain, allowing them to cash in. Ro¨ell (1996) points
this as one of the reasons for the performance of an IPO, also concluding that
the founders are less willing to sell a major stake because they want to retain
control over the company. Pagano et al. (1998) reveal that after the IPO
there is a period of high turnover in the control of the company, despite the
fact that the controlling group keeps a majority position in the company,
consistent with the work of Ro¨ell. In another study, Albornoz and Pope
(2004) concluded that divestment from original shareholders was the reason
for a group of IPO firms that were acquired afterwards. In a study of the
Swedish IPO market, Rydqvist and Ho¨gholm (1995) concluded that “owners
reduced the net investment in their own firm to nearly 50% of the previous
level”. Comparing the conclusions of Pagano et al. (1998) and Rydqvist and
Ho¨gholm (1995) we can state that there is no unique strategy in an IPO.
For example, Mello and Parsons (1998) assumed that the optimal strategy
was a staged-one, in which in a first stage the IPO was performed to small
investors, selling the controlling block in a second stage. This approach is
similar to the one of Zingales (1995) which studies the transfer of control
through an IPO. These two studies assume the perspective of an IPO as a
way to transfer control.
When initial owners intend to exit, they may look for moments of over-
valuation of the industry or the market. This would allow compensating
the costs of the IPO and taking advantage of the optimism of the market.
Ritter (1991) uses this window of opportunity theory to help explaining the
long-term underperformance of IPOs. To this author, even when the issuer
sets a correct price for its shares, the market can produce extremely large
returns in the first day, due to an overoptimistic view about the earnings
potential of the issuing company. Firms take advantage of this sentiment in
the market and issue, generating a poor performance in the future. Lee et
al. (1991) observe that the investor sentiment (measured by Value-Weighted
Discount on a portfolio of closed-end funds at the beginning of the period)
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is an important determinant of the IPO activity. This excessive optimism of
investors is reported also by Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) and Lerner (1994).
There is the possibility that managers, venture capital funds or owners can
effectively time the market, in order to take advantage of some window of
opportunity. There are some studies that try to measure this capacity of
timing the market. For example, Brau and Fawcett (2006) conclude that
“CFOs define the window of opportunity in terms of overall stock market
and industry conditions rather than IPO market conditions”. In Rajan and
Servaes (2002) the market sentiment for an industry drives the number of
IPOs in that industry, concluding that the IPOs are made when the industry
is overvalued relative to the market. Pastor and Veronesi (2003) conclude
that the probability of an IPO is a function of a variation in terms of val-
uation (return) and not in terms of the valuation itself. Another study, by
Blum (2011) reinforces this window of opportunity theory concluding that
“to maximize proceeds firms must time an IPO in accordance to the business
cycle as well as overvaluation and low volatility in the stock market”. Fi-
nally, Baker and Wurgler (2007) consider that there is a positive correlation
between the market sentiment and the number of IPOs, supporting the idea
of window of opportunity used by so many authors to explain the activity in
this segment.
Other motivation usually reported is the cost of monitoring that private
companies require. Pagano and Ro¨ell (1998) state that the IPO allows to
reduce these costs leading to an increase in the value of the company, exist-
ing a lower risk of entrenchment of the management team. Other authors
have denoted the importance of the stock market as a management monitor-
ing tool because the price of the stock allows to compare companies within
an industry making it more probable the occurrence of a takeover and the
monitoring by large shareholders (Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Bolton
and Von Thadden (1998)). The type of costs referred above are the typi-
cal agency costs presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976), more specifically
principal-agent costs. However, Dalziel et al. (2010) shed some light over
costs sometimes omitted in literature, such as the board monitoring and the
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distraction of directors from their main activities to concentrate in the pro-
cess. According to these authors, this may lead to an increase in operational
costs or to the loss of some investment opportunities. In another article,
Dalziel et al. (2011) explore the heterogeneity among principals. This het-
erogeneity leads to a suboptimal performance of the firm, where one of the
shareholders may redirect governance devices according to its own interests.
Usually it is also referred that companies perform IPOs in order to finance
new investments or to deleverage the company after the execution of any
expansion project. Pagano et al. (1998) observe that the investment of com-
panies after the IPO actually decrease, suggesting that companies use this
process to rebalance their balance sheet, decreasing the weight of debt and,
consequently, the costs of debt financing. A contrasting finding was made by
Albornoz and Pope (2004) and Kim and Weisbach (2008), concluding that
IPOs are actually motivated by large investments that occur after the pro-
cess. In the survey of Brau and Fawcett (2006), the answers of the CFOs
allowed to conclude that the timing of the IPO is strongly influenced by the
“need for capital to support growth”. In a study of privately-held companies,
Boehmer and Ljunqvist (2004) and Bharath and Dittmar (2006) supported
the idea that investment opportunities increase the probability of an IPO.
The last motive massively studied is the acquisition motive. The IPO al-
lows the company to issue stock and later in their lifetime, they may aim
to buy other companies. Instead of offering money to the shareholders of
the target company, they may offer shares. Thus, the IPO gives the chance
to create a new coin of exchange for further acquisitions. Theoretically, in
periods of high valuation of the stocks, the company could use them to fi-
nance these acquisitions, reducing the need for capital in these operations.
Albornoz and Pope (2004) concluded that companies that were acquired af-
ter the IPO had as their basic incentive the promotion of that takeover. On
the contrary, Brau and Fawcett (2006) rejected the idea that companies go
public to be acquired in the future, showing that in the majority of the cases,
IPO companies were acquirers in the future, concluding that “IPOs facilitate
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acquisition activity”. Also, they found no statistical significant difference
between IPO firms and private firms regarding their positioning to become
targets of takeovers. Finally, they concluded that IPOs were used to allow
the creation of a new way of payment (using stocks as currency), reinforc-
ing the answers given by the CFOs. The idea of IPO as a way to facilitate
acquisition activity and to create “currency” for those acquisitions is also
supported by Celikyurt et al. (2010) which study the US IPOs from January
1994 until December 2004, with proceeds higher than $100 million.
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, an IPO involves certain economic
costs. A firm has to comply with several standards, causing it to spend
money and time to prove its compliance. According to the PwC Roadmap
for an IPO, before the IPO the company incurs in expenses related to legal
and accounting advisors, the filing fee, the exchange listing fee and under-
writing fees. These are around 7% of the total proceeds from the IPO in
US, according to a study by Abrahamson et al. (2011). Although, for Euro-
pean IPOs, underwriting fees are consistently lower than those paid in US.
Draho (2000) simply divides these costs as direct costs, including filing fees,
legal expenses and administrative costs and indirect costs, which are the un-
derwriting fees. Dalziel et al. (2010) shed some light over costs sometimes
omitted in literature, such as the board monitoring and the distraction of
directors from their main activities to concentrate in the process. This may
lead to an increase in operational costs or to the loss of some investment
opportunities.
From the literature referred above, we can understand that an IPO is an
option that the owner of the company has, allowing us to model the optimal
timing of an IPO as a Real Option. This field of study in finance allows
to model several business and management decisions the same way financial
options are treated. The first to contribute to this field of study was Myers
(1977) that, building on the work of Black and Scholes (1973), identified
the importance of distinguishing between assets in place and opportunities
to grow, which value is computed by the use of Real Options. Soon, this
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new field was adapted to many applications, most of them concentrated in
the valuation of investment opportunities. This kind of approach allows to
overcome the main limitations of the Net Present Value (NPV) approach.
One of the main works in this field is the one Dixit and Pindyck (1994).1
Despite the huge amount of work regarding Real Options, such as McDonald
and Siegel (1986), Luerhman (1998) and Bowman and Moskowitz (2001),
there are not many authors that aimed to study IPOs with Real Options.
One of the first models that times IPOs was created by Zingales (1995).
The author looks at the IPO as a way of transferring control in the company.
Starting with a separation between cash flow and control rights, Zingales sug-
gests that the owner must sell the former first, retaining the control of the
company. After that, the owner must sell the rest of the company in a direct
negotiation. As the author assumes, this model is suitable for subsidiaries.
In a different approach, Draho (2000) considers the dynamics of going public
using relative valuation techniques. This way, the author values the waiting
option and considers its exercise as a cost of the IPO. In this model, private
companies are valued in accordance to market indexes. The author conclu-
sions help to explain the hot markets subject, being these a consequence of
the optimal exercise of waiting options. Using a binomial model, Benninga et
al. (2005) model the decision to go public considering that at the beginning
of each period, the owner of the company can take the company public or
keep it private (or turn it into a privately held company or not, in the case
of being public in the previous period). If the company is private, the owner
will receive the value of its cash flows and the private benefits of control.
If it is public, its shareholders will receive the cash flows, besides the gains
of diversification. When the cash flows are sufficiently high, the gains from
diversification outweigh the private benefits of control and the company goes
public. Casassus and Villalon (2010) propose a framework where the IPO
company (or group of companies) may have an impact in the market condi-
1If you’re interested in this field of study and want to know more, see also Trigeorgis,
Lenos (1996), Real Options – Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource Allocation,
The MIT Press or Copeland, Tom and Antikarov, Vladimir (2003), Real Options: A
Practitioner’s Guide, New York, Cengage Learning
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tion, being this impact known by the entrepreneur before the decision. With
a general-equilibrium model and studying only the diversification motive to
perform an IPO, the author concludes that bigger companies will perform
the IPO first, because of greater gains from diversification.
Bustamante (2012) uses signaling game theory to model the time of IPOs.
It is assumed that companies time their decision in order to provide private
information to outsiders. This way, Bustamante demonstrates that in cold
markets, the best companies start the IPO process earlier, in order to signal
their quality. On the contrary, in hot markets, all companies go public at
the same time.
We will build our model on top of the basic model of Bustamante. We change
it in several ways, in an effort to make it more realistic. Bustamante’s model
is a signaling one, in which asymmetry appears in the difference between
good and bad companies. However, her basic model considers perfect infor-
mation. Also, it is considered that the company performs the IPO to fund
the expansion of its current business. We relax the inexistence of asymmetric
information, considering that there is a variable reflecting the market sen-
timent. This variable reflects the premium investors are willing to pay to
acquire the company, reflecting the lower amount of liquidity that the owner
of the company obtains, when compared to a sale of the totality of the com-
pany. We consider likewise that the company performs the IPO to allow the
owner to exit from its initial investment. This assumption is only considered
in our first model which aims to construct a basic model for the next analy-
sis. Later on in our work we will introduce another approach, differentiated
from the one of Bustamante. We consider that an investment will be taken
after the IPO but, unlike Bustamante, in our case the investment will allow
the company to enter a new segment in the market. Another aspect that
is lacking in the basic model of Bustamante is the costs of the IPO. As we
have seen before, these can be divided between direct and indirect costs. We
consider both of them in our analysis.
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Notice that we have constructed over the basic model of Bustamante. In
fact, the author corrects some of the aspects referred above, such as the
absence of costs in the operations and the inexistence of asymmetries of in-
formation. However, the author conducts her work to construct a signaling
model, having a very different objective, when compared to our analysis that
ignores differences in companies and focuses on the market sentiment and its
impact in their valuation.
In the next section we will design our first and basic model, considering
that the company has no opportunities to grow and only seeks the listing to
allow its owners to exit. We will show that the company will only undertake
the IPO if the market is overvalued. Further in our work, we will improve
the basic model, with the objective of incorporating the investment motive
to perform the IPO.
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Chapter 3
The Market Sentiment and the
Optimal Timing for an IPO
3.1 Benchmark Model
The starting point of our work was the basic model developed by Bustamante
(2012). In the first section of this article, the author considers the optimal
timing for an IPO with perfect information. This is the model that we use
as the basis of our work. The company makes the IPO to finance a project
which allows to expand the current cash flows, which is implemented simul-
taneously with the IPO.
Despite the fact that the author develops in further sections of her arti-
cle a model that considers asymmetric information, mainly considering the
difference between good and bad companies, we believe that there are some
critics that must be referred to this model. The first one is the concept of
information asymmetry in the model. This model is a signaling model aim-
ing to time the IPO decision of different companies. This difference between
companies is present a factor that measures the growth capacity of a firm,
with that factor being bigger for good companies than for bad companies.
We introduce a different idea, consistent with Pastor and Veronesi (2003)
where companies go public due to changes in the variations observed in the
12
market. Our factor of market sentiment, θ, can be seen as a premium that
investors are willing to pay to have part of that company. This implies that
all companies, independently of their type, may have incentives to go pub-
lic when the market is overvalued. The other aspect that we believe to be
important is the inclusion of the costs of the IPO. In the simplest model,
Bustamante (2012) does not consider these costs. These costs can either be
fixed or variable.
We have first designed a model in which a well established company, with-
out any growth opportunity, aims to perform an IPO. Thus, the owner (or
perfectly aligned owners) performs this IPO in order to exit from the initial
investment, consistent with the literature presented above (Ro¨ell (1996), Ry-
dqvist and Ho¨gholm (1995), Pagano et al. (1998) and Albornoz and Pope
(2004)). This way, we do not condition our model to the case of companies
that have an investment opportunity. In a first model, we consider companies
aiming to explore the market overvaluation, considering that the owners will
behave in a opportunistic way (Ritter (1991), Lee et al. (1991), Lerner (1994)
and Ibbotson and Ritter (1995)). This rationality of the owner is based on
the idea that the owner does not have any financial restriction. This way,
he won’t have any urge to turn the company publicly traded because he
has no need to exchange part of his stake for money. If there were any re-
strictions, the owner could have the temptation to sell, even if it wasn’t for
an amount that compensated the loss of that stake plus the IPO costs. The
inclusion of the investment opportunity will be conceived in the next chapter.
Finally, it is important to notice that we have included a variable for the
market sentiment. The reasoning behind this variable is that the owner
knows the true value of the company and knows when the market is over-
valuing it or not. However, this valuation bias on the market side is not
necessarily a sign of market inefficiency. The market can overvalue the com-
pany because it sees a possibility of expanding it if the company turns to be
publicly listed.
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3.2 The Model
We will use the Contingent Claims Approach, as defined by Dixit and Pyn-
dick (1994). The present value of future cash flows, Vt, follows a Geometric
Brownian Motion (gBm) process, represented by:
dVt = µVtdt+ σVtdz (3.1)
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process, µ is the risk-neutral instan-
taneous conditional expected relative change in V (or drift) and σ is the
instantaneous conditional standard deviation. Note that µ = r − δ, being
r the risk-free rate and δ the opportunity cost from deferring the process.
Also, it is important to state that V0 > 0.
Virtually, every private company has the option to go public. This option,
as any financial option, has a cost associated with it. According to financial
literature, according to the literature presented above, can be divided in two
types. First, a fixed amount, that we denote by C > 0, that covers all the
expenses such as auditing, monitoring and legal fees, between others. Sec-
ond, a variable amount, hereafter λ > 0, which is the amount paid to the
underwriters.
Also, the owner will sell a fraction φ ∈ (0, 1] of its stake in the company.
We consider that this value is exogenously chosen (similar to the basic model
of Bustamante (2012)). To sell this stake, the owner will consider market
conditions, trying to exploit any mispricing. This is coherent with the as-
sumption that there are no financial constraints. Consequently, the owner
will only sell if the market is overvalued, paying a higher premium, captured
by θ. We assume that this factor already includes the IPO premium reported
by Brau et al. (2003) due to the inexistence of a liquidity discount for the
company insiders.
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Finally, we have considered an all equity company, meaning that the com-
pany has not incurred in any kind of debt to leverage its activity. Thus, the
owner is the only one entitled to receive the cash flows of the company.
The IPO option value for the owner, F (V ), must satisfy the following or-
dinary differential equation (ODE):
σ2
2
V 2
∂2F (V )
∂V 2
+ µV
∂F (V )
∂V
− rF = 0 (3.2)
The general solution for this ODE is given by F (V ) = A1V
β1 + A2V
β2 .
Where:
β1 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
+
√(
µ
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
σ2
(3.3)
and
β2 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
−
√(
µ
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
σ2
(3.4)
With β1 > 1 and β2 < 0.
To compute the optimal moment to perform the IPO we have to impose
some boundary conditions. The first one is the absorbing barrier and is
stated as:
F (0) = 0 (3.5)
This condition means that if the company does not generate cash flows, the
value of the option must be zero. The second condition is the value matching
condition and is as follows:
F (V ∗) = P ∗(φ, θ, λ, V ∗, C)− φV ∗ (3.6)
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where P ∗(φ, θ, λ, V ∗, C) = φ(1 − θ)V ∗(1 − λ) − C represents the proceeds
from the IPO. The value matching condition states that at the moment of
the exercise of the option, the value of that option is given by the difference
between what he receives, P ∗(φ, θ, λ, V ∗, C) and what he loses, −φV ∗. No-
tice that the costs are incurred by the owner because those are taken prior
to the IPO, per se. Also, have in mind that the owner bears the costs of
underwriting.
Finally, we have the smooth-pasting condition that ensures that the op-
tion value is equal in V ∗ for both branches and that the transition between
branches is smooth. It is given by:
∂F (V ∗)
∂V ∗
=
∂P ∗(φ, θ, λ, V ∗, C)
∂V ∗
− φ (3.7)
These three conditions allow us to discover the values for A1, A2 and the
optimal moment V ∗.
3.3 Solution of the Model
The boundary conditions consist on the restrictions that allow us to define
the model. Hereafter, we will develop them in order to obtain the value of
the option to perform an IPO.
From the absorbing barrier, we have:
lim
V→0
F (V ) =∞ (3.8)
Given that β1 > 1 and β2 < 0, we must set A2 = 0, otherwise the absorbing
barrier condition would not be satisfied. Using the smooth-pasting condition
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we determine V ∗ as being:
V ∗ =
β
β − 1
1
φ
C
θ(1− λ)− λ (3.9)
Replacing this in the value matching condition and solving for A1, we deter-
mine that:
A1 = [P
∗(φ, θ, λ, V ∗, C)− φV ∗]
(
1
V ∗
)β1
(3.10)
In order to maintain economic meaning we say that the owner will only
undertake an IPO if:
θ(1− λ)− λ > 0⇔ θ > λ
1− λ (3.11)
From the expression above we know that the IPO will only be undertaken if
the market is sufficiently overvalued in order to compensate for the variable
costs, consistent with what we have stated above.
Replacing A1, A2 and V
∗ in F (V ), we have the following expression for
the value of the option to perform an IPO:
F (V ) =
[P
∗(φ, θ, λ, V ∗, C)− φV ∗]
(
V
V ∗
)β
if V < V ∗
P ∗(φ, θ, λ, V, C)− φV ] if V ≥ V ∗
(3.12)
Notice that the value of the company for the owner corresponds to the sum
of the assets in place and the option to perform the IPO, V + F (V ), being
in accordance with the theory of Myers (1977).
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3.4 Comparative Statics and Numerical Ex-
ample
3.4.1 Comparative Statics
After obtaining the expressions for the computation of the trigger and the
option value, we will study the impact of variations of different variables in
the value of each of them.
Starting with the trigger (V ∗), we have seen that it is a function of θ, σ,
φ, C and λ. Taking the derivatives:
∂V ∗
∂θ
< 0 (3.13)
∂V ∗
∂σ
> 0 (3.14)
∂V ∗
∂φ
< 0 (3.15)
∂V ∗
∂C
> 0 (3.16)
∂V ∗
∂λ
> 0 (3.17)
The market sentiment has a ”negative relation” with the trigger value to
perform the IPO. This is an intuitive result given that the owners will take
advantage of market overvaluations to sell their company. This allows the
owner to cash in some money which they can invest in other businesses and
reduce their exposure to risk.
The optimal moment to IPO a company (defined by its optimal value) is
a positive function of the volatility and the costs of the IPO, both fixed and
the underwriting fees. The volatility signals is consistent with the theory
of financial options pricing, when referring to call options. The impact of
costs is rather intuitive. As they become larger, so does the trigger value
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of the company, meaning that large costs can only be supported by larger
companies.
On the contrary, the optimal level of cash flows is negatively affected by
the stake of the company to be sold and by the market sentiment.
These results are consistent with the ones of Draho (2000) that finds a
positive relation between the optimal level and the costs (both direct and
indirect) of the IPO and with the volatility. A negative relation was found
regarding the size of the issue.
3.4.2 Numerical Example
To illustrate this first model we take into consideration the case of Houghton
Miﬄin Harcourt Company (NASDAQ:HMHC), a well established company,
formally created in 1880 (it existed since 1832). This company dedicates to
the publishing of educational material for the primary and secondary educa-
tion. In 2013, the company decided to turn itself publicly-traded. This 130+
year old company started listing in the NASDAQ on November 14, 2013.
According to Quartz, the objective of this IPO was to allow for the exit of
existing shareholders1.
The data used for this illustration is presented in the table below:
Variable Value Description
µ 0.01 Risk-neutral drift
σ 0.25 Volatility
θ 0.133 Market sentiment
φ 0.15 Stake to be sold
λ 0.06 Underwriting fees
C $4.5M Cost of the IPO
Table 3.1: Data for the application of the Model
1See: http://qz.com/144968/181-years-after-its-founding-this-company-is-finally-
going-public/
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We have assumed the value for the risk-free rate, the opportunity costs, the
volatility and the market sentiment. To the first three parameters was at-
tributed an usual value in this kind of examples. Any change in those values
can be studied according to the analysis in the previous section. The value
of the underwriting fees was taken from the 2013 Annual Report of the com-
pany, in which is referred that the company has paid $0.72 per share to
underwriters. Dividing this value by $12, the initial price of the shares, we
obtain the 6% fee. The cost of the IPO was also taken from the Annual
Report. This operation had a total cost of $19.6 million, being $15.1 from
underwriting fees and the rest from other costs related to the issuing. The
stake to be sold in the IPO is given by the ratio between the amount of shares
sold (20.9 million) and the total number of shares (139.9). Finally, we have
used the value premium estimated by Brau et al. (2003) that concludes that
IPOs are on average overpaid by a factor of 13.3%.
Applying expression (3.9), we obtain an optimal value of the cash flows to
perform the IPO of $1,685 million. Using the financial statements of HMHC
for the fiscal year of 2012, we can compute an actual value of discounted
future cash flows as being of $1,615 million. This way, we can see that the
company has performed the IPO near the optimal moment according to the
model’s prescription.
As it can be seen above, the optimal moment to perform the IPO is di-
rectly related to the market sentiment. Thus, it is important to perform a
more detailed analysis of this factor, given the importance that it assumes
in our model.
3.5 Studying the Market Sentiment
According to our model, any company without a growth option needing to
be financed only considers an IPO if, and when, the market sentiment is
sufficient to pay for the costs of the process. This is a logic result given that
the owner of the company is not interested in exchanging a valuable asset for
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a less valuable one, if we assume he has no financial constraints.
However, we can work in the other way around and try to understand what
has to be the market sentiment in order to be optimal an IPO in the present
moment? This implies that V ∗ = V1.
Taking equation (3.9) and equalizing to V1, we obtain the following expression
for the estimation of the θ factor.
θ∗ =
β
β − 1
C
φV1
1
1− λ +
λ
1− λ (3.18)
Other way to interpret this result is, assuming that companies are making
their decisions in an optimal way, what is the current market sentiment. This
way, the estimation above allows us to measure the premium investors are
willing to pay to invest in that company.
3.6 Conclusion of the chapter
In this chapter we have considered an all equity company that looks to the
IPO market as an opportunity to change its ownership, providing the owners
an opportunity to exit, benefiting from a positive market sentiment. Conse-
quently, the option will be exercised when there is a higher optimism in the
market, being this one of the possible causes to the hot markets issue.
However, there is the possibility that a company performs an IPO in or-
der to obtain funds to finance a project. This has several consequences in
terms of timing, being one of them the possibility that the owner consid-
ers the process not only in periods of higher optimism, but also in periods
of lower optimism, receiving a lower amount during the process. It is this
situation that we are going to explore in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
IPOs, Market Sentiment and
Investment Opportunity
4.1 The Setting
The model developed in the previous chapter considered only a small range
of situations in which the companies performed an IPO. In this chapter we
intend to get closer to the model of Bustamante (2012), considering that the
company has the opportunity to invest but, at the same time, we distance
from her model considering that the company intends to use the proceeds
from the IPO in order to enter a new segment of the market. Thus, the com-
pany is not expanding the current business but financing the entry in a new
one. An example of this kind of managerial behavior is the case of Facebook,
for instance. After the IPO on May of 2012, the social network company
entered several businesses through the acquisition of other companies. These
range from social media related companies to sound studio or virtual reality
companies.
Assuming a similar approach compared with the previous model, investors
will be willing to pay a premium when buying the company. However, this
premium can be divided into two components, θ1 and θ2. The first one is
the premium investors are willing to pay for the current business of the com-
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pany. The second corresponds to the premium related with the new segment.
This model is based on the investment opportunity idea that can be found
in Boehmer and Ljunqvist (2004), Kim and Weisbach (2008) and Brau and
Fawcett (2006), among others. This means that immediately after the IPO
the company will invest in order to expand its cash flows. While these au-
thors do not differentiate between an investment in the existing segment and
a new segment of business, we consider that it concentrates in a new line of
business. This implies that companies have a business that is well developed,
trying to find a new source to increase their growth rate and, consequently,
their value. Thus, we consider that the company is investing in a segment
that is strategically important for its future, leading to a higher premium.
As we will see below, we won’t use a factor of growth as Bustamante (2012)
did. We will consider that this factor is already reflected in the premium
that investors are willing to pay when investing in the company.
To develop this model we need to distinguish between the old cash flows
of the company and the ones that arise from the new investment. This im-
plies the utilization of two stochastic processes. The basis for this work is
the one of Adkins and Paxson (2011). In this article, the authors solved a
model with two stochastic variables without homogeneity of degree one. The
methodology followed here is similar to the one presented in that article.
This section is divided as follows: first we will present the pillars of our
model; second, we will present its solution, followed by the comparative stat-
ics and the numerical example. Finally, we conclude and synthesize the main
ideas.
4.2 The Model
Using the Contingent Claim Approach, as defined by Dixit and Pyndick
(1994), we will have two stochastic processes that follow distinct Geometric
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Brownian Motions (gBm) that are represented as follows:
dX = µXXdt+ σXXdz, (4.1)
where X = {V1, V2}, µX is the instantaneous conditional expected relative
change in X, σX is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation and dz is
the increment of a Wiener process. Notice that µV1 = r−δ1 and µV2 = r−δ2.
The covariance between the two variables is given by:
Cov[dV1, dV2] = ρσV1σV2V1V2dt (4.2)
In this model we aim to build a boundary as a function of V1 and V2 in order
to define, for each level of each of the variables, when it is optimal to perform
an IPO. This implies that both variables must attain their threshold levels
in order to the company turn itself publicly-traded.
As before, we assume that the company has to pay a fixed amount to perform
the IPO. This amount, represented by C > 0, is supported by the owner of
the company pre-IPO. The underwriting fees, λ ∈ (0, 1], are also supported
by the owner of the company. As stated above, the company will perform an
investment in a new segment. Similarly to Bustamante (2012), this invest-
ment occurs at the same time (or right after) of the IPO. This investment
cost is represented by I and is included in the same way as in Bustamante’s
model. Furthermore, this investment has associated a cash flow stream that
will be presented by V2 (being V1 the cash flow stream of the old business).
Both these segments will have associated a premium investors are willing to
pay. Thus, θ1 represents the premium for the old business and θ2 the pre-
mium for the new business. As stated before, the new segment where the
company is investing is expected to have a higher growth rate that the old
one (θ2 > θ1).
The value of the option to perform an IPO, F (V1, V2), must satisfy the fol-
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lowing partial differential equation (PDE):
1
2
σ2V1V
2
1
∂2F (V1, V2)
∂V 21
+
1
2
σ2V2V
2
2
∂2F (V1, V2)
∂V 22
+ ρσV1σV2V1V2
∂2F (V1, V2)
∂V1∂V2
+
+ (r − δ1)V1∂F (V1, V2)
∂V1
+ (r − δ2)V2∂F (V1, V2)
∂V2
− rF (V1, V2) = 0 (4.3)
The general solution for this PDE has the form:
F (V1, V2) = AV
β
1 V
η
2 (4.4)
Replacing F (V1, V2) in equation (4.3) we obtain the following elliptical equa-
tion:
Q(β, η) =
1
2
σ2V1(β − 1)β +
1
2
σ2V2(η − 1)η + ρσV1σV2βη+
+ (r − δ1)β + (r − δ2)η − r = 0 (4.5)
The equation above describes an ellipse. For β = 0, the equation becomes:
Q(0, η) =
1
2
σ2V2(η − 1)η + (r − δ2)η − r = 0 (4.6)
Solving equation (4.6) in order to η we find two roots, a positive and a
negative. The same applies for the case of η = 0. In that case, the equation
becomes:
Q(β, 0) =
1
2
σ2V1(β − 1)β + (r − δ1)β − r = 0 (4.7)
As Adkins and Paxson (2011) argue:
”(. . . ) the ellipse passes through all 4 axes and has a presence in each of
the 4 quadrants. When we impose the line β + η = 1 on the graph Q = 0,
represented by the line LL’ in Figure 1, it clearly intersects the function at
2 distinct points, A and B. If homogeneity degree 1 holds, the values of β
and η are uniquely specified by points A and B. When homogeneity degree 1
does not hold, the values of β and η will lie somewhere along the arc ADB
or ACB, depending on whether β + η is greater than or less than 1. Thus,
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we require additional information from the boundary conditions in order to
solve β and η when β + η 6= 1.”
Figure 4.1: Representation of equation (4.5) from Adkins and Paxson (2011).
Source: Adkins and Paxson (2011)
The figure above illustrates the statement from Adkins and Paxson referred
above.
Following Adkins and Paxson (2011) methodology, we will develop a function
that arises from the value matching and from the smooth-pasting condition.
This function will intersect the function Q(β, η) = 0, generating the val-
ues for β and η. From figure 4.1 we can infer the possible values for these
variables.
S1 : {β1, η1} → β1 ≥ 0, η1 ≥ 0; (4.8)
S2 : {β2, η2} → β2 ≥ 0, η2 ≤ 0; (4.9)
S3 : {β3, η3} → β3 ≤ 0, η3 ≤ 0; (4.10)
S4 : {β4, η4} → β4 ≤ 0, η4 ≥ 0; (4.11)
Thus, we can rewrite the solution of equation (4.3) as being:
F (V1, V2)H = A1V
β1
1 V
η1
2 + A2V
β2
1 V
η2
2 + A3V
β3
1 V
η3
2 + A4V
β4
1 V
η4
2 (4.12)
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As in the previous model, we need to establish the boundary conditions that
will allow us to find the solution.
The first boundary condition is the absorbing barrier. It is expressed be-
low. It is similar to the one in the previous chapter. However, in this case
we are stating that if the cash flows of both investments tend to zero, the
value of the company to the owner is zero and so does the option.
F (0, 0) = 0 (4.13)
The second boundary condition is the value matching condition. This
one says that the value of the option for the owner in the moment of exercise
equals the stake of th new segment that he retains, plus the proceeds from
the IPO, deducted by the stake that he has lost and the investment cost.
The proceeds from the IPO can be expressed as follows:
P ∗(φ, θ1, θ2, V ∗1 , V
∗
2 , λ, C) = φ[(1 + θ1)V
∗
1 + (1 + θ2)V
∗
2 ](1− λ)− C (4.14)
The value matching condition is given by:
F (V ∗1 , V
∗
2 ) = (1− φ)V ∗2 + P ∗(φ, θ1, θ2, V ∗1 , V ∗2 , λ, C)− φV ∗1 − I (4.15)
Contrary to the previous model, in which we had a smooth-pasting condition,
we now have two. This happens because there are two stochastic variables.
Thus, the following two equations define the smooth-pasting conditions.
∂F (V ∗1 , V
∗
2 )
∂V ∗1
= φ(1 + θ1)(1− λ)− φ (4.16)
∂F (V ∗1 , V
∗
2 )
∂V ∗2
= (1− φ) + φ(1 + θ2)(1− λ) (4.17)
With these boundary conditions we can determine the IPO boundary. Con-
trary to the previous model, we cannot provide a closed-form solution, as we
will explain in the following section.
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4.3 Solution of the Model
From the absorbing barrier we can easily conclude that A2, A3 and A4 are
equal to zero. Thus, the solution for F (V1, V2) can be reduced to:
F (V1, V2) = A1V
β1
1 V
η1
2 ≡ AV β1 V η2 (4.18)
Consequently our function regarding the value for the shareholder is given
by:
F (V1, V2) = AV
β
1 V
η
2 (4.19)
We now have three equations (equation (4.15)-(4.17)) for four variables to
be determined. Since the number of unknows is bigger than the number of
equations, we cannot provide a unique solution for our model, meaning that
there is no closed-form solution. Thus, we are going to determine a boundary
of countless pairs of {V1, V2}.
While in the previous model there was a threshold after which the IPO
should be undertaken, now we have a region where the IPO should occur
and other where it should not. Thus, every company after having computed
the value of the new segment can simply calculate the value of the current
business after which it should turn publicly-traded.
In the next section we will explore a practical example. The procedure
adopted was to consider a fixed value for the company that is considering
the IPO. This allows us eliminate a variable that needs to be determined
and remain with four variables (A1, β, η, V2) for four equations, the ellipse
(equation (4.5)) and equations (4.15) to (4.17).
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4.4 Numerical Example and Sensitivity Anal-
ysis
Numerical Example As explained at the end of the previous section,
there is no close-form solution for our model. However, Adkins & Paxson
(2011) developed a method that allowed to define a discriminatory boundary
between the IPO decision and the non-IPO decision, being indifferent to do
it or not in that boundary.
We have used Mathematica software to compute several values of the bound-
ary. Using those values, we have created a graphic representing these points
and, finally, we have regressed those values in order to obtain that boundary.
This is a very simple analysis with a very powerful output.
We will construct over the case of the previous model. However, it is neces-
sary to consider some new variables. Let us imagine that Houghton Miﬄin
Harcourt Company has the possibility to enter in a new and fast-growing
business, such as the Apps market. The table below represents a summary
of the variables used.
Variable Value Description
r 0.03 Risk-free interest rate
δV1 0.02 Discount rate of the old segment
δV2 0.025 Discount rate of the new segment
σV1 0.25 Volatility associated to the old segment
σV2 0.35 Volatility associated to the new segment
ρ 0.2 Correlation between the two segments
φ 0.15 Stake to be sold
λ 0.06 Underwriting fees
C $4.5M Cost of the IPO
θV1 0.133 Market sentiment for the old segment
θV2 0.25 Market sentiment for the new segment
I $40M Investment needed to enter the new segment
Table 4.1: Data for the application of the Model
We are considering here that an investment of $40 million is necessary to
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construct an infrastructure to develop this business. As it is a relatively new
business, the volatility associated with it is higher than the volatility of the
old segment of the company. Also, the premium is considered to be higher
because of the appetite of the investors for companies in this new segment
(similarly to what happened in the dotcom bubble). We assume that the
owner(s) is(are) trying to sell 15% of the company and that the underwriting
fees and the fixed costs of the process are the same.
We will start by computing the value of V2 for which is optimal to per-
form the IPO, considering the actual value of the company (V1 = $1, 614.19
million). We could also perform this exercise on the opposite direction, i.e.
having the actual value of the new segment, we could compute the optimal
value of the company after which we should perform the IPO.
Using the FindRoot function in Mathematica, we determine that the value
of V ∗2 is $125.71 million, with a β = 0.1571 and η = 1.2867.
After this, we must induce some changes in V1 and execute the FindRoot
function again. The following table illustrates some of the results obtained:
V1 0.00 695.29 1,177.47 1,615.19 2,149.82 2,861.41 3,462.3
β 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.25 0.41 0.59
η 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.28 1.24 1.19
V2 189.74 161.49 142.45 125.71 106.28 82.97 66.48
Table 4.2: Results from variations in V1
With these results we are now in a position of creating the boundary that
will help in the decision making. The figure below demonstrates this relation
between V1 and V2.
As we can see from figure 4.2, there is a ”negative relation” between the value
of the current business and the value of the new business, meaning that an
increase in the value of the new business demands a lower value of the current
business, leading to an earlier IPO. On the contrary, if the value of the new
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Figure 4.2: Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions
business is relatively small, the IPO must be made later, demanding a bigger
initial business.
Below we will study the impact of variations in several variables, aiming
to understand its impact on the trigger values.
Sensitivity Analysis In this section we will impose some changes in the
variables of the model. The objective is to study the impact of those varia-
tions mainly in the trigger of the second segment.
Variations in θV1 In the previous chapter, when analyzing the impacts
of variations in the market sentiment we have concluded that higher levels of
market sentiment lead to lower trigger values. Now, there is a new segment in
which the company is going to enter after the IPO. We tested for three levels
of market sentiment: the original one, of 0.133, a lower one of 0.09975 and a
larger one of 0.16625. The graphic below depicts the differences between the
three levels.
As it can be seen, the level triggers for the new sector tend to diminish with
increases in the market sentiment of the old sector. This happens because,
as before, the owner tends to take advantage of this market premium to take
the company public. This way, a higher market sentiment anticipates the
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Figure 4.3: Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different θV1 ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1
IPO process. Table (4.3) shows the variations in the trigger value of the new
segment to our current value of the business:
θV1 0.09975 0.133 0.16625
V2 155.77 125.71 97.98
Table 4.3: Results from variations in θV1 . The remaining inputs are according
to Table 4.1
As in the previous model, there is a tendency to anticipate the IPO given
market conditions.
Variations in θV2 Regarding θV2 , this factor has less impact in the de-
termination of the trigger of the new segment. This is so because in our
setting the new segment is much smaller than old segment, being not so rel-
evant as the old segment. Just to illustrate, the graphic below shows the
conclusions for three different values of θV2 : 0.1875, 0.25 and 0.3125.
As we can see, there are small moves of the boundary for the right or left,
depending on a decrease or increase in the market sentiment for the new
segment, respectively.
The below figure could have been different if the new segment was more
relevant.
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Figure 4.4: Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different θV2 ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1
Variations in ρ This parameter highlights the correlation between the
old segment and the new one. If we recall the diversification theory of
Markowitz (1952), the correlation between two assets must be negative in
order to reduce risk. Applying these insights to our model, companies will
tend to diversify their business in order to reduce it. Thus, we expect that
the trigger for the new investment (considering the actual value of the com-
pany) decreases with decreases in the correlation. To study the impact of
different levels of correlation, we have computed the different values of the
trigger for the second segment with different levels of correlation.
Figure 4.5: Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different ρ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1
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From the graphic above we can comprove that a decrease in the correlation
between the two segments leads to a decrease of the trigger values. This re-
inforces the idea from Markowitz Portfolio Theory. Just as an example, the
trigger value for our actual value of the company would be, for each scenario
considered:
ρ 0 0.2 0.5 1
V2 114.75 125.71 142.09 169.27
Table 4.4: Results from variations in ρ. The remaining inputs are according
to Table 4.1
This relationship between the correlation and the optimal value of the new
segment to perform an IPO is a logic result given the fact that similar seg-
ments are more exposed to the same risks. Thus, the diversification effect is
not so strong. Consequently, a higher value for the new segment is required
to perform the IPO and invest in it.
Variations in σV1 Theoretically, an increase in the volatility of the old
segment means that the value of the option to perform an IPO is bigger. The
graphic below highlights this idea:
Figure 4.6: Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different σV1 ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1
Figure (4.6) expresses very clearly this idea. The following table reinforces
it, by showing an increase in the trigger for the new sector with a decrease
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of the volatility in the old sector.
σV1 0.15 0.25 0.35
V2 129.66 125.71 118.21
Table 4.5: Results from variations in σV1 . The remaining inputs are according
to Table 4.1
From this analysis we can conclude that an increase in the volatility of the
old segment implies a lower trigger value for the new segment. This happens
due to the idea that risk is represented by volatility. Thus, a more volatile
segment, given the correlation between segments, will induce an earlier IPO
to reduce the overall risk of the company.
Variations in σV2 It is expected that a higher uncertainty regarding
the new segment is associated with higher triggers. It is a natural result
given the fact that if the owner has to take more risks, he will be more keen
to invest in something that has a more certain value. That justifies a delay
of the IPO decision. Figure (4.7) demonstrates this.
Figure 4.7: Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different σV2 ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1
As it can be seen, the boundary of the IPO decision moves to the right while
we increment the volatility associated to the new segment. It can also be
seen in table (4.6), which presents the value of the trigger for the actual value
of the current business under different levels of volatility.
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σV2 0.25 0.35 0.45
V2 88.07 125.71 174.23
Table 4.6: Results from variations in σV2 . The remaining inputs are according
to Table 4.1
Contrary to σV1 , higher volatilities in the new segment represent higher risk
for the company. This leads to a delay of the IPO when compared to lower
σV2 ’s.
Variations in φ The percentage of the company to be sold has a sig-
nificant impact in the determination of the trigger value of the new segment
and, consequently, of the IPO decision. Figure (4.8) shows us the boundary
curves for three different scenarios of φ: 0.1, 0.15 and 0.2.
Figure 4.8: Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different φ’s.
The remaining inputs are according to Table 4.1
For lower values of φ, the owner of the company tends to defer the IPO,
with the trigger of the new sector being larger. This can be explained by
thinking that if the owner is going to retain a higher share of the company,
he will be less willing to invest in a new business unless it proves to be the
right business.
Table (4.7) shows us the the trigger level for these three possible values of
φ for the current value of the old business: This conclusion from the model
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φ 0.1 0.15 0.2
V2 147.64 125.71 105.25
Table 4.7: Results from variations in φ. The remaining inputs are according
to Table 4.1
is in line with the Behavioral Finance idea of mental accounting that states
that people tend to take more risk with money earned by other means than
work. As the owner has already sold part of its stake, he is less exposed to
the new segment and therefore is more keen to invest in it.
Other factors: λ, C and I The impact of these variables was not
very relevant or already studied in the previous chapter, not justifying a
deep study.
Relatively to λ, an increase in the fees paid during the IPO process tends to
delay this decision, increasing the trigger for the new sector.
This analysis is similar to the one for the costs of the IPO (C) and for
the investment cost to enter in the new segment (I). An increase in any of
these costs leads to an increase in the trigger of the new segment for any
current value of the old segment, deferring the IPO process.
4.5 Studying the market sentiment
As in the previous chapter, it is important to understand the dynamics of the
market sentiment in the decision to perform the IPO. As before, the premium
that investors are willing to pay for the old sector continues to anticipate the
IPO and subsequent investment. The logic underlying this conclusion was
already presented. More importantly is to understand what was the mini-
mum market sentiment for the owner to sell the company.
To study this we continuously replaced this parameter for lower values, until
the moment where we get a value for the new segment lower than the in-
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vestment cost. Logically, in that case, it would have no economic meaning
to perform the IPO and, therefore, to invest in the new segment. We have
obtained a value of 3.3216% (or θv1 = 0.033216). It is interesting to notice
that the value of the option would be negative or zero in economic terms.
In the case of the first model, the IPO would have to allow the owner to
receive at least the fair value for the company, plus the costs of the IPO. In
the second model, even for lower values of market sentiment than the one
computed on chapter three, it would be optimal to perform the IPO.
Regarding θV2 , as explained before, the sensitivity analysis didn’t allow us to
demonstrate the real impact of this variable. This was so due to the param-
eters defined by us. However, we will illustrate here a different case. Let us
imagine that the investment cost was $400 million. The impact of variations
in θV2 is represented in the graphic below. The remaining of the variables is
given in table 4.1, except I = 400.
Figure 4.9: Boundary between non-IPO and IPO regions for different θV2 ’s
In this graphic two ideas become clearer. First, the greater the market sen-
timent, the greater the forces that drive for the decision to perform the IPO.
Second, the new segment becomes much more important for the company.
The slope of the curve denotes this difference. While in the first analysis of
θV2 , a decrease of $1 million in V2 had to be compensated by an increase of
V1 of $26 million, now the necessary increase is of $24 million, highlighting
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the decrease of importance of the old segment.
4.6 Conclusion of the chapter
During this chapter we tried to give a step further in order to provide a
framework for real life IPO’s. This is a very demanding process for the
owner/management team and we aimed to focus on the main decisions. We
considered a case where the company performs the IPO to allow not only the
exiting of the owner but also the entering in a new segment. This implied the
inclusion of some factors, such as the volatility and the market sentiment of
the new segment, the investment cost to ensure the new line of business and
the correlation between the two segments. It is important to notice that this
entry in a new segment can be done in very different ways. We considered
here an entry with an investment from the ground, however this can be made
by acquiring an existing company, for example.
It is important to notice the impact of both the volatility of the new segment
and the correlation between segments in the decision making process. Both
these factors play a very important role in the determination of the trigger
for the investment. Also, the percentage of the company to be sold has a
very interesting role considering the behavioral hindsights.
Finally, in the study of the market sentiment we concluded that the sen-
timent in the old segment played a similar rolen when compared to the pre-
vious chapter. The sentiment in the new segment also presented a negative
relation to the market timing, meaning that a higher sentiment represented
a lower trigger to perform the IPO.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Contribution to Financial Literature
During this work we have developed two models that aim to support the
decision for an IPO in different settings.
Our main goal was to create a model that did not concentrate in the market
sentiment but, at the same time, allowed to study it. We have focused on the
managerial decision, bearing in mind that this decision is taken considering
a given framework for the owner. This is the logic undedrlying the inclusion
of a variable for the market sentiment. And it is this way that we have given
a step forward on IPO literature. As presented in Chapter 2, the main works
regarding the IPO process with a Real Options perspective are the ones from
Draho (2000), Benninga (2005) and Bustamante (2012). These works build
over different perspectives but with a similar objective, to time the IPO. Our
distinctive approach allowed us to differentiate from these works. While the
basic model clearly lies on the market sentiment parameter, showing us that
the manager/owner would only perform the IPO if the market was paying
more for the company than the value he attributes to her, the second model
does not depend exclusively on this parameter.
This capacity to focus in the management decision allows to determine, in
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the second model, the timing of the investment and of the IPO. Also, the
inclusion of some behavioral insights allows to approximate our model to re-
ality, trying to overcome the typical critics that appear to financial models.
As defined before, there is plenty of space to develop from now on, being im-
portant to build models that help the decision making process of the owners
of these companies. Thus, we think our model provide a solid ground to build
on in the future. Being this such an important aspect of the strength of an
economy, any model that helps entrepreneurs to better decide are welcome.
We differentiated from the work of Bustamante, the model that we’ve used
as a basis for ours, by ignoring the signalling game idea. In her article, Bus-
tamante builds over this idea, creating a dynamic between private firms. In
our model, we define the moment as a sole decision. This way, our model
applies also to companies that are the first in their sector to perform IPOs.
Obviously, in this case, the market sentiment would have to be adapted,
given that we had no benchmark to evaluate the market.
In conclusion, we tried to build a solid model, based in a very well-established
theoretical environment. We reconciled evidence from many authors identi-
fied in the literature review with the objective of providing an intuitive, but
realistic, model.
5.2 Further Work and Limitations of our Model
The path until this final point allowed us to find several aspects we would
like to include but, because of time constraints and the objectives of a Mas-
ter Dissertation, were not developed, yet. We believe to be in a position to
address some possible paths for further studies.
First, we were considering the inclusion of agency issues. As Dalziel et
al. (2011) shows there are some costs of an IPO that arise from principal-
principal conflicts. These can have a great impact in the IPO decision.
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Second, we omit here the presence of debt. As it can be seen from our
examples, we do not consider the existence of debt, ignoring a factor that
can promote the IPO, anticipating it. On the other hand it could be a factor
of deferral of the IPO because the owner could leverage the company first
and only after that promote the going public process, receiving more funds
in the meanwhile. Also, Ro¨ell (1996) demonstrates that the IPO allows to
reduce the leverage of the company, being this one of the motivations for the
process. It would be interesting to include this factor here.
Third, the computation of the θ parameters should be based on behavioral
methods. This would allow to reconcile two very innovative and interest-
ing fields of finance: Real Options and Behavioral Finance. Considering the
contributions of both these fields, they would probably provide a bigger con-
tribute if they could be developed together. However, Considering that this
is not the main goal of this work, we believe that the measure proposed suf-
fices to demonstrate the model.
Finally, the consideration of two separate models with the objective of build-
ing an equilibrium model. One of the models would represent the perspec-
tive of the owner (or owners) of the company. The other would represent
the market perception and willingness to enter in this process. The idea of
equilibrium model is directly related to Traditional Finance. This ”double-
headed” model would allow to join Traditional and Behavioral Finance along
with the Real Options perspective. It is possible that the model would be so
complex that it was almost inoperable, however it would allow to understand
better the market for IPOs.
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